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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FLINT JESCHKE, l 
Plaintiff/Appellant, i 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, ) 
Intervenor- i 
Appellant, 
vs. 
I APPELLEES' BRIEF 
DAVID T. WILLIS and GRANITE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, : Civil No. 890229-CA 
Defendants/Appellees• t 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Jeschke and Intervenor-Appellant Hansen 
have taken this appeal from the decision of the Third Judicial 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
assessing bad faith attorney's fees because plaintiff's continual 
lies and material misrepresentations constituted bad faith and 
demonstrated a lack of merit to his claims in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-27-56? Unless a finding of fact is clearly 
erroneous, the trial court's ruling is to be given substantial 
deference. Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1987). 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in awarding 
attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, against Attorney Hansen based on its finding that 
Hansen knew or should have known of the lack of merit of his 
client's cause of action? Unless there is a clear abuse of 
discretion, the trial court's ruling is to be given substantial 
deference. Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1987). 
3. Whether this Court should impose attorney's fees 
for the prosecution of a frivolous appeal pursuant to Rules 33 
and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are controlling in 
this action: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1990) 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall 
award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that 
the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may 
award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an 
affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the 
reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper 
of a party represented by an attorney shall 
be signed by at least one attorney of record 
in his individual name who is duly licensed 
to practice in the state of Utah. The 
attorney's address also shall be stated. A 
party who is not represented by an attorney 
shall sign his pleading, motion, or other 
paper and state his address. Except when 
otherwise specifically provided by rule or 
statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity 
that the averments of an answer under oath 
must be overcome by the testimony of two 
witnesses or of one witness sustained by 
corroborating circumstances is abolished. 
The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, 
motion, or other paper is not signed, it 
shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the pleader or movant. If a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay 
to the other party or parties the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other 
paper, including reasonable attorney's fee. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous 
appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in 
a criminal case, if the court determines that 
a motion made or appeal taken under these 
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include 
single or double costs, as defined in Rule 
34, and/or reasonable attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party. The court may order that 
the damages be paid by the party or by the 
party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of 
these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing 
law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one 
interposed for any improper purpose such as 
to harass, cause needless increase in the 
cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages 
upon request of any party or upon 
its own motion. A party may 
request damages under this rule 
only as part of the appellee's 
motion for summary disposition 
under Rule 10, as part of the 
appellee's brief, or as part of a 
party's response to a motion or 
other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is 
upon the motion of the court, the 
court shall issue to the party or 
the party's attorney or both an 
order to show cause why such 
damages should not be awarded. The 
order to show cause shall set forth 
the allegations which form the 
basis of the damages and permit at 
least ten days in which to respond 
unless otherwise ordered for good 
cause shown. The order to show 
cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party 
against whom damages may be 
awarded, the court shall grant a 
hearing. 
Rule 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. 
Every motion, brief, and other paper of a 
party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record who 
is an active member in good standing of the 
Bar of this state. The attorney shall sign 
his or her individual name and give his or 
her business address, telephone number, and 
Utah State Bar number. A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall sign any 
motion, brief, or other paper and state the 
party's address and telephone number. Except 
when otherwise specifically provided by rule 
or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers 
need not be verified or accompanied by 
affidavit. The signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certificate that the 
attorney or party has read the motion, brief, 
or other paper; that to the best of his or 
her knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not 
frivolous or interposed for the purpose of 
delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, 
brief, or other paper is not signed as 
required by this rule, it shall be stricken 
unless it is signed promptly after the 
omission is called to the attention of the 
attorney or party. If a motion, brief, or 
other paper is signed in violation of this 
rule, the authority and the procedures of the 
court provided by Rule 33 shall apply. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of 
attorneys and parties. The court may after 
reasonable notice and an opportunity to show 
cause to the contrary, and upon hearing, if 
requested, take appropriate action against 
any attorney or person who practices before 
it for inadequate representation of a client, 
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a 
person allowed to appear before the court, or 
for failure to comply with these rules or 
order of the court. Any action to suspend or 
disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall 
be referred to the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee of the State Bar for proceedings in 
accordance with the Rules of Discipline of 
the State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. 
This rule shall not be construed to limit or 
impair the court's inherent and statutory 
contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. 
An attorney who is licensed to practice 
before the bar of another state or a foreign 
country but who is not a member of the Bar of 
this state, may appear, upon motion, pro hac 
vice. Such attorney shall associate with an 
active member in good standing of the Bar of 
this state and shall be subject to the 
provisions of this rule and all other rules 
of appellate procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the prosecution of a claim for 
injuries allegedly caused by an automobile accident. The appeal 
therefrom does not involve an appeal of the jury verdict, but an 
appeal of the imposition of bad faith attorney's fees against 
both the plaintiff and his attorney. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On June 8, 1987, plaintiff Flint Jeschke ("Jeschke") 
brought suit against defendants David T. Willis ("Willis") and 
Granite School District ("Granite") for injuries, lost income, 
and other expenses allegedly resulting from a rear end accident 
between himself and defendant Willis. (R. 2-3). Following trial 
of the case on November 9, 10 & 14, 1988, the jury found that 
defendant Willis' negligence was not the proximate cause of the 
injuries claimed by plaintiff. (R. 321-322). The trial court 
likewise noted that its findings were the same as those of the 
jury. (R. 510 at 301). 
On December 7, 1988, defendants filed a Motion for Bad 
Faith Attorney's Fees and Costs. (R. 370-387). Following 
consideration of plaintiff's Motion and Affidavits in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion, and Defendants' Memorandum and Response 
thereto, (R. 392-424), the trial court entered its findings and 
granted defendants' motion as follows: 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-56(1), the court 
awarded $10,000 in bad faith attorney's fees against the 
plaintiff. (R. 427); 
2. Under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
court found "that counsel for the plaintiff could or should have 
sensed the nature and lack of merit in the case certainly from 
and after the meeting invited by the State's attorneys on August 
3, 1988. Therefore the court [found] plaintiff's counsel to have 
proceeded in bad faith and [awarded] against him a judgment in 
the amount of $2,000." (R. 427). 
Based on the above, judgment was entered against 
plaintiff and his attorney on February 2, 1989. The Notice of 
Appeal was thereafter filed on February 21, 1989. 
C. Statement of Facts 
As set forth in the record below, plaintiff was 
involved in a minor rear-end traffic accident on October 4, 1985, 
with defendant David Willis, a school bus driver for Granite 
School District. On June 8, 1987, plaintiff filed suit demanding 
judgment for past and future medical and chiropractic expenses, 
loss of income, general damages for pain and suffering, permanent 
disability, and loss of quality of life for injuries and damages 
allegedly caused by the accident with defendant Willis. (R. 2-
3 ) ^ 
Inasmuch as bad faith is essentially a factual determination 
based on the evidence and record as a whole, defendants will 
highlight some of the more salient points in support of the trial 
At the taking of his deposition, plaintiff gave sworn 
testimony to the following: 
(1) That the bus hit his truck hard enough to knock it 
2 
forward fifteen to twenty feet. (R. 502 at 41-42). 
(2) That his truck was in good condition when 
purchased and had no dents in it whatsoever. (R. 502 at 76). 
Further, that no repairs, other than routine maintenance repairs, 
had ever been made to the truck before the bus accident of 
October 14, 1985. (R. 502 at 76). As to prior accidents, 
plaintiff testified: 
"Q. Had you ever had any accidents with that truck 
you were driving the day of the bus accident before the date of 
the accident? 
A. No. 
Q. None at all? 
A. No.- (R. 502 at 76). 
(3) That his truck received damages from the bus 
accident which included the whole rear end, major damage to the 
tailgate, bumper, quarter panels, rear lights, etc. (R. 502 at 
57-64) . 
(4) That the dollar amount of damages was $1,101.99 
and that the repairs indicated were the same as what plaintiff 
stated as damages. (R. 502 at 64, 65). 
Cont. Cont. Cont. court's judgment. Some testimony will 
be cited from the depositions, as necessary, in response to 
certain arguments and factual averments raised in Appellant's 
Brief. 
2 
At trial, plaintiff stated that his car was pushed forward ten 
to fifteen feet. (R. 508 at 25). 
I " I 1 I I f 11 I a i n t i f f w a s h e a 1 1 Ii i \ 11 v h i i" (nii 1 1 y i"i 1 i \ i i 111111 
unrest i icted In IIIL physical ac t iv i t i es j ii the yeai preceding the 
bus accident, (IN, "ilK? at B4-H'| 
f il  i ||i il  I il  il i I il  i i 11 ill ill < i I 1 V f ( * 1 mi in in i I '(I i i i mi q i mi i n I in i mi mi mi I i I i mi i , 
198 lp w h e r e i n lie f i a t i u i e i l ! ii v e i t e b r a e JII l i i b luwei back f lh 
502 iHt 1 Bi 7 , iiiiii i j a i n t l f f f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a i h** v^«- n ] 
a b o n ( f i f 1 \ IIIIII in I ii" I if MI IK HI mi ii in I I Ii i I I In "III I | I I I I ml M I i JI I | I 
502 a t J 5 7 - J ! > U ) . When q u e s t i o n e d r e g a r d i n g o t h e r i n j u r i e s l i m n 
t h e j e e p a c c i d e n t n o t e d in h i s m e d i c a l r e c o r d s fe i| , ii c l o s e d 
liea 11 i in I MI I i| i | 11 I I I ill I I I I i si i I! JII "ill I II I n ii i i-iiieiidbei imy t h o s e 
i n j u r i e s m I lA)2 a t J 6 U ) , P l a i i i l i t t a l s o s t a t e d t h a t h e had 
f u l l y r e c o v e r e d f rom t ho JIM * J a r r i d p n t ; t h a i ' hie hdil in in I m 
bat.l" p i f i M i • , iiij hi1, JI). JL li(.»i , i I had l u l l i a n g e o i m o t i o n (R . 
502 tit !?*/, HH in A c c o r d i n g t o p l a i n t i f f , a l l (if h i s p r o b l e m s a n d 
a i l m e n t s w e r e n r e s u l t nf t in I i" Mien MUMII \V Ml1 nil III | 
i m m c i , t l i u i i i i jJ j e e p a e c i t i e u L was s a i d t o be n o t a s d e v a s t a t i n g 
a s t h e b u s a c c i d e n t | I» . b 0;' a t 165 ) . 
( ' | II ill II i I II 1 1 1 I II i l l i I II II i in II i i o l l • 1 1 I i 1 1 L i & e i j L J H . " I II I I i I I III II il 111 1 1 J ; ! 
accident, Willi legard to subsequent accidents, plaintiff 
testified: 
" Q • III I i i 11 in in II in i II i I  in mi II \ Li II i  i i 11- > 1 1 1 > f, 1 ii II j b c - » q u e 1 1 1 I 11 I 1 1 e d u t e 
of your bus accident? 
? 1 1 
(8) I I s physici ,"s everything that 
occurred at t he t - \- .-* cident ! * everything abou 
pri or med i c a I  1 it i s toi-v t 
1 1 3 ] 18 1 51 152) . 
Because the evidence developed through discovery and 
investigation strongly indicated bad faith and probable fraud, 
Attorney Hansen was invited to counsel's office to discuss the 
case to ensure that Hansen was made aware of the more significant 
inconsistencies, lies and material misrepresentations made by his 
client. (R. 381, 375). In the meeting held with Hansen on 
August 9, 1988, the following information/documents were, inter 
alia, shared with Hansen; 
(1) Documents from a rear-end accident claim made by 
plaintiff on his automobile insurance carrier a few weeks prior 
to the bus accident, which included a police accident report, 
estimate forms, etc. (R. 375). Mr. Hansen was specifically 
shown an original polaroid photograph of the rear of plaintiff's 
truck taken on August 15, 1985 by plaintiff's insurance carrier. 
(R. 375). A large blow-up of the same photograph was used at 
trial by defendants' accident reconstructionist, Newell Knight. 
(R. 509 at 160 and Exhibit 13-D). 
(2) The two original photographs of the rear of 
plaintiff's truck taken four days after the bus accident by David 
Crocker, the adjustor for Granite School District. (R. 376). 
Blow-ups of these two photographs were also used at trial. (R. 
509 at 145 and Exhibits 11-D and 12-D). 
(3) The original check made out to plaintiff for over 
$900.00 for repairs which plaintiff claimed for damages allegedly 
resulting from the bus accident. (R. 376 and Exhibit 10-D). 
(4) f\ check made out in plaintiff's behalf for a 
rental uar " |R 3 ! 6) 
i| ! in Mi •» J j ca ] r e c o i els f i oin Jol n i Reani„„ M D document ing 
t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of f i l a i n t i f f ' s I n j u r i es; from t h e e a r l i e r j e e p 
a c c i d e n t • (I t 3 7 6 ) . 
( 6 ) M e d :i c • a J i: e c o r d s £ r o ID B U r n s C1 i i r o p r a c t i c C1 i n 1 c 
documenting that plaintiff had a motorcycle accident i n March, 
1986. (IF 3 3 6) 
( J ) 11 isurance records documenti ng that p 1 aintiff had 
madp a claim on h is health insurance carrier, Gem State Mutua] , 
f o x L>ack i l i j U X J . e s f l " n I in H I M I M m f i 1 i M i i in I i :! 7 G ) . 
Because plaintiff, had claimed lumbal spinn problems 
from the but accident, and had denied accidents or injuries 
S u b c C J I I I I M l I I I III I II III I I I ( i l ' I I I I II III III II i l l I i i ' III 1 III i H i l l I II 1 1 I I 1 i d I I, 
Mi. Hansen was shown tlidf. c h i r o p r a c t o r B u r n s ' l e t t e r t o Hansen of 
A p r i l i i "I c o n t a i n e d no merit,ion *•»* i"wrr b v k in "jury ^ 
l<rol icni win f r ii il-stsjii HuUi. ILI I t i I iifc-L I " 1! was 
now a t t r i b u t i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of lower brick p rob lems t o t h e bus 
a c c i d e n t | h 1' | I lli• Hanr»nn was a l s o S-IUMAHII lliiiii \ i I lli il in 
l i jp ' i1 i I I In I MI I rli1 MuLuiil I n s u r a n c e covei iny I he m o t o r c y c l e 
a c c i d e n t , t h e r e a p p e a r e d t o be a c o r r e l a t i o n between c l a i m s o i 
Inniiltfi? involvement from t h e bus arrirliMil ,inl ,u m ,1 i mm I rliml I P 
I J I I " ., by IJ i I l« r o p r a c t i c t o buLh Gem St ri te Mutual and S t a t e 
" "m I n s u r a n c e ( p l a i n t i f f ' s a u i o i n s u r a n c e c a i r i e r i i 
Hansen ttnni IMIJI II MI I I I HI ml I II I I HI in HI I I I I t i ,>i n iiii 11 in i IIIIIJI i m nun 
In h i s d e p o s i t i o n , p l a i i i t i f f s t a t e d t l l a t 1 le eA^xu^ 
h i s g i r l f r i e n d ' s ca r while h i s car was being r e p a i r e d . 
Burns Chiropractic on the motorcycle accident and stated that it 
looked like Brian Burns had committed insurance fraud. (R. 377). 
At the conclusion of the meeting, Hansen asked whether 
Utah State Risk Management would consider giving him a nuisance 
settlement. (R. 377). Shortly thereafter, Hansen was informed 
of the State's position that plaintiff himself should take no 
further benefit from his actions, but that defendants would 
nevertheless pay $300.00 to defray costs incurred by Hansen, and 
would forego pursuit of a crossclaim against plaintiff. (R. 
378). There was never any response to defendants' offer. (R. 
378) . 
Hansen also indicated that he intended to put no more 
time or effort into the case and did not, for example, attend the 
deposition of his own expert, Brian Burns. (R. 378). He did, 
however, request a copy of the police report documenting the 
prior rear end accident of August, 1985. (R. 378). Finally, 
Hansen telephoned defendants' counsel in late September, 1988, 
informing him that he was now convinced that his client had lied, 
and that he was therefore withdrawing from the case and would not 
4 
try the case, irrespective of whether he received a settlement. 
(R. 423). 
The above telephone conversation, as set forth in Defendants' 
Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Bad Faith Fees and Costs, was necessarily considered 
by the trial court in assessing bad faith attorney's fees and 
costs. This same representation was also discussed in the course 
of the in-chambers proceeding of October 4, 1988. (R. 511 at 13, 
16). Plaintiff's version of the in-chambers proceeding appears 
on page five of Appellant's Brief. 
i o_ 
Notwithstanding the August ' 1988 meetin i i . " 
represent .ii i on^ marie by Hansen that hr i i» uithdiawmy t i om the 
case, plaintiff um.l Attorney Hansen proceeded tin tiiaJ, 
P l a i n t i f f w n r i i p r e s s f i i i I | llh i i < il ill I i i ill I i i lliiiii I I In i i i s I r 
o t i L L t i b i t iL . l t I d c t s piii t a J. in Jiy l v t h y H d i l i e i i e a i « e n d a c c i d e n t 
a n d t h e e x i s t e n t v < ' *- -< ^ *-. e rf j"*crd c i~ un^"'* r -
t h e n i i b s p q i i f i 11 
p l a i n t i f f ' s s t o r y c i o i i , . - . " ^ * l a r ^ g f s ' r »i 
major a c c i d e n t w i t h t lie s c h o o l hub d i d iiwt c h a n g e . As s t a t e u jjy 
I ( ( i l l M I! I II III | I I | I! I III I I ,1 I VIIII." I l l ' 
The evidence is going to si low that Mr. 
David Willis, the individual defendant, drove 
the bus and struck the rear end of Mr. 
Jeschke's vehicle which was a 1 980 Toyota 
that he had only for a year or so. And that 
after the—and it knocked it about fifteen 
feet. 
* t Ir 
Within the hour, actually less than an 
hour after he was at work, then he suffered 
pain that he could tell his neck was stiff 
and sore. He had a headache and he knew this 
was not a minor injury that he sustai ned 
* * * 
[I]n any event, what happened was that 
he sustained some very serious injuries that 
were painful, that curtailed his range of 
motion, and ultimately caused an impairment 
rating by Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg, the 
orthopedic medical doctor to whom he was 
referred by Dr. Burns to make sure that he 
was getting all the help the medica ] 
profession could provide . . . . 
I ii I -
Dr. B r i a n Burns gave him, i\ 2 51 
[ i ri ipa i r inent ] r a t i n g . 
He only lost two weeks initially from 
work because the chiropractor said you can't 
go to work in this condition for at least two 
weeks. So he was off work for two weeks and 
lost the income that he had that was fairly 
substantial as an electrician during that 
period of time. But that was small compared 
to the fact that later in the spring, after 
struggling through the wintertime, he found 
he really couldn't hack it, that is, work 
eight hours a day at the rigorous, strenuous 
activity that an electrician has to go 
through . . . . 
• * • 
Let me just tell you what I think the 
evidence will show with respect to [the jeep 
accident of 1983 that] he was fully recovered 
from that prior accident and his present 
injuries are related and caused by the bus 
accident, not by the prior automobile 
accident. 
(R. 508 at 7-10)(emphasis added). 
In support of the claims made in his opening statement, 
plaintiff called Thomas Soderberg, M.D. and Chiropractor Brian 
Burns as expert witnesses. Dr. Soderberg took a patient history 
to determine the origin of plaintiff's problems with his neck and 
back. (R. 508 at 70). Dr. Soderberg attributed plaintiff's 
injuries to the bus accident and stated that the amount of impact 
does not necessarily determine the amount of injury. (R. 508 at 
81-82). 
On cross-examination, Soderberg admitted that the only 
records and x-rays he examined were his own. (R. 508 at 86). 
Moreover, his sole source of information about plaintiff's 
medical history was the plaintiff himself. (R. 508 at 85). 
Additionally, his opinion that plaintiff's pain or tenderness was 
caused from the bus accident was largely dependent on the history 
given by plaintiff. (R. 508 at 100). 
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records or x-rays pertaining to the plaintiff. (R. 505 at 48). 
Defendant David Willis observed no damage to the bus, 
nor any visible damage to plaintiff's truck, and believed that 
the accident was minor. (R. 509 at 116). Furthermore, at the 
scene of the accident, plaintiff told Willis that he was not 
hurt, that there was no damage to his truck and that he was in a 
hurry to get to work. (R. 509 at 115-116). 
The insurance adjustor, David Crocker, spoke with 
plaintiff within a few days of the accident and photographed his 
truck. (R. 509 at 140, 144 and Exhibits 11-D and 12-D). In the 
course of meeting with Mr. Crocker plaintiff claimed major damage 
to the rear of his truck, e.g., bumper, tail light, tail gate, 
lower panel, and parts of the side panels. (R. 509 at 140). 
Based on plaintiff's story, a check was thereafter issued to 
plaintiff in the amount of $932.65 for property damage allegedly 
caused by the bus accident. (R. 509 at 142 and Exhibit 10-D). 
Newell Knight, an accident reconstructionist, 
determined that the impact speed of the bus accident was near 
zero miles per hour and that the vehicle damages claimed by the 
plaintiff were not possible. (R. 509 at 166). Mr. Knight 
Although Burns claimed expertise in the reading of x-rays and 
radiographs at his deposition, and had obtained prior x-rays from 
Dr. Ream and/or St. Marks Hospital at the time his deposition was 
taken (Burns Depo., pp. 131-133), Burns did not testify at trial 
regarding the findings or significance of any x-rays or 
radiographic evidence. 
A significant portion of Mr. Knight's testimony involved the 
very photographs of plaintiff's truck which were shown to 
plaintiff's attorney in the meeting of August 9, 1988. (R. 376, 
509 at 154-155). Plaintiff's attorney never requested copies of 
the photographs that were shown to him. 
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Paul M. France, Ph.D., a biomechanical engineer with 
considerable experience in the area of spinal trauma, concluded 
that the interior construction of plaintiff's vehicle and the 
forces and motions involved in the accident were not sufficient 
for plaintiff to sustain the injuries claimed. (R. 509 at 210). 
Dr. France also indicated that, at most, plaintiff could have 
experienced some pain from the bus accident due to his pre-
existing chronic injury, but that the pain would be of little 
significance or duration. (R. 509 at 214). 
Reed Fogg, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon specializing in 
spinal care, determined that "from the time of the jeep rollover 
in 1983 . . . there really ha[d] not been any significant change 
which would indicate that . . . in [1985] there had been 
increased trauma." (R. 509 at 229). He strongly believed that 
the bus accident did not create the discomfort or disability that 
plaintiff claimed. (R. 509 at 231). Dr. Fogg further noted the 
strong contradiction present in a situation where a patient 
claiming injury cannot work, but is out riding dirt bikes and 
playing basketball. (R. 509 at 238). 
Lastly, Eugene Hawkins, a seasoned chiropractor of many 
years experience, believed that the chiropractic records of Brian 
Burns, plaintiff's primary health care provider, were very 
incomplete and inadequate. (R. 506 at 6). Given the situation 
of 107 visits and 25 "no shows," Dr. Hawkins stated that the 
record of care showed a lack of concern from the doctor's 
viewpoint and the patient's lack of concern with his own care. 
(R. 506 at 7-8). Dr. Hawkins further indicated that the 
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presented anothei version of his alleged injuries, ftb stated by 
Attorney K * u.. - 11 „> s I ng a i g nine n t i 
£ T j h e rea^ questioi i is 1 now much of the 
injuries that came out of the bus accident 
alone are the cause of the difficulty 
[plaintiff has] had. And in view of the 
evidence we've had I'm not here to contend 
that we have a major case. At best/ we have 
a minor case, 
f ~ " ~ -8)(emphasi s added). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The award of attorney's lens aqainst the plaintiff 
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a c t u a l k n o w l e d g e of p l a i n t i f f ' s l i e s and m a t e r i a l m i s -
representations, yet made no reasonable inquiry into the validity 
of plaintiff's claims. Attorney Hansen merely relied on 
plaintiff's assurances and did not pursue or examine the readily 
available evidence which would have quickly shown that 
plaintiff's claims were without merit. The trial court found 
that Attorney Hansen's actions demonstrated a total failure under 
the circumstances to conduct the reasonable inquiry required by 
Rule 11. That finding is fully supported by the record and is 
not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
This Court should also impose reasonable attorney's 
fees against plaintiff and Attorney Hansen for the filing and 
prosecution of a frivolous appeal. The record in support of the 
award of attorney's fees below is overwhelming, demonstrating 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Plaintiff's 
and Hansen's only purpose in pursuing this appeal was to attempt 
to re-argue their case in hopes that this Court will make more 
favorable findings of fact. Moreover, plaintiff and Hansen have 
not asserted good faith arguments in their attempt to overturn 
the trial court's findings of fact. Consequently, this appeal is 
devoid of merit and has no reasonable likelihood of success. The 
only possible purpose for this appeal is to delay or otherwise 
impede execution of the judgment against plaintiff and his 
attorney in violation of Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IMPOSED 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-27-56 
WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, BUT WAS FULLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD, 
The leading case interpreting Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-56 
is Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). In Cady, the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth three conditions which must be met before 
a court may impose attorney's fees under S 78-27-56: (1) the 
party receiving the award must be the prevailing party; (2) the 
claim must be found to be without merit; and (3) the party's 
7 
actions must be lacking in good faith. Id. at 151. 
A. The Defendants Prevailed at Trial. 
The first requirement under Cady is that the party to 
whom the award of attorney's fees is given must be the prevailing 
party. In the present case there is no question that defendants 
are the prevailing party. The jury and trial court found that 
there was no causation between the bus accident and the claimed 
injuries and the plaintiff was therefore awarded zero damages. 
(R. 321-322). 
B. The Plaintiff's Claims were Without Merit. 
As to the second requirement, "without merit" is 
defined as being similar to frivolous, which is "of little weight 
or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady, 671 P.2d at 
151. While in Cady, the determination of merit hinged on the 
legal validity of a power of attorney, the instant case is 
without merit because there is "no basis in . . . fact" to 
7 
Although S 78-27-56 has been amended since Cady, the amendment 
does not affect the Cady analysis. 
support plaintiff's claims. Consequently, unless the trial court 
abused its discretion in finding that plaintiff's claims were 
without merit, that decision should be affirmed 
The defendants' unrebutted evidence adduced at trial 
fully supports the finding that there was a complete lack of 
merit to plaintiff's claims. Neither the personal injuries nor 
the property damages claimed by plaintiff could have resulted 
from the accident. The accident reconstructionist, Newell 
Knight, concluded that the impact speed was next to zero and that 
the damages claimed by plaintiff were simply not possible. (R. 
509 at 166). Dr. France, defendants' biomechanical engineer, 
examined plaintiff's truck and determined that the interior 
construction of the truck, combined with the forces and motions 
involved in the accident, were not sufficient to cause the 
injuries that plaintiff claimed. (R. 509 at 210). Finally, Dr.s 
Luers and Fogg, with full knowledge of plaintiff's complete 
medical history, strongly believed that the bus accident did not 
cause the injuries that plaintiff claimed. (R. 509 at 200-202, 
231).8 
Although plaintiff's expert witnesses, Dr. Soderberg 
and Brian Burns, stated that plaintiff's injuries were caused by 
the bus accident, their opinions were based on false premises. 
Both Soderberg and Burns based their opinions of the cause of 
plaintiff's claimed injuries on the medical history given to them 
by plaintiff. (R. 508 at 85 and R. 505 at 24-25, Burns Depo., p. 
For a more complete summary of this testimony, defendants 
refer this Court to pp. 16-19 of this brief. 
36-37). On presenting himself for treatment, plaintiff 
apparently told Burns he had been involved in a "substantial 
automobile accident." (R. 505 at 30). Finally, Burns could not 
have seriously considered the medical relevance and importance of 
the previous major jeep accident given plaintiff's own self-
serving representation that he had fully recovered from that 
g 
accident. (R. 502 at 87, 88). 
Further evidence of the lack of merit in plaintiff's 
claims is his dramatic change of position at the conclusion of 
the case. Plaintiff initially claimed that the bus accident was 
a major accident which caused serious injuries and that all of 
his injuries were a result of the bus accident. Yet in closing 
argument, plaintiff changed his story and tried to contend that 
he had only minor injuries, at best, from the bus accident: 
[T]he real question is how much of the 
injuries that came out of the bus accident 
alone are the cause of the difficulty 
[plaintiff has] had. And in view of the 
evidence we've had I'm not here to contend 
that we have a major case. At best, we have 
a minor case. 
* * * 
[W]hen you compare the testimony of that 
array of witnesses within the range of what 
On cross-examination at trial, Burns admitted the importance 
of patient honesty. Although he waffled on the importance of a 
patient's medical history at trial (R. 505 at 24-25), his 
depostion testimony was much less ambiguous: The honesty of the 
patient is M[p]robably the biggest factor of all [in getting a 
good history] . . . . You sure get off on the wrong start if you 
don't have a good history." (Burns Depo., pp. 41-42). 
Although Burns had obtained prior radiographs at the time his 
deposition was taken, the record and trial transcript give no 
indication that he ever considered the radiographic evidence and 
medical history which was available to him independent of the 
plaintiff. 
we call major I think we can pretty well 
forget about this category. 
• • • 
It was a minimal type of injury and ones 
we were asking for in the way of damages in 
this case* 
(R. 510 at 268, 274, 294)(emphasis added). Plaintiff's change of 
position and his denial of major injury as he had originally 
claimed is a damning self-indictment. This change is essentially 
an admission that plaintiff's claims were devoid of merit and 
that defendants' evidence overwhelmingly showed that lack of 
merit. 
Plaintiff's argument that "the strongest case against 
[his] testimony could only be that his testimony may not have 
been well founded due to his ignorance of medical matters and his 
belief that his injuries complained of were an aggregation of his 
prior condition" is unworthy of belief. (Appellant's Brief, p. 
12). The evidence presented at trial showed that the bus 
accident was a minor accident and that the injuries claimed by 
plaintiff were simply not possible. Moreover, the determination 
of whether a claim has merit is established on whether there is a 
legal or factual basis for the claim, which is based on the 
existence of objective criteria, not on subjective inner beliefs. 
Consequently, plaintiff's dubious claim of ignorance, even if 
genuine, has no bearing on whether his claim had merit. The 
record as a whole does have bearing on whether plaintiff's claims 
are without merit and the record fully supports the trial court's 
determination that plaintiff's claims had no merit. 
C. The Plaintiff's Own LieB, Misconduct and Material 
Misrepresentations Demonstrate His Bad Faith. 
The third requirement under Cady is that a party 
against whom the award is made must have acted with a lack of 
good faith. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. Quoting Tacoma Assoc, of 
Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 458, 433 P.2d 901 (1967), 
Cady defined good faith as: H'(1) An honest belief in the 
propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or 
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, [sic] 
hinder, delay or defraud others.' . . . Bad faith is found when 
one of the three elements heretofore stated is lacking." Cady, 
671 P.2d at 151. Additionally, in Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 
1101 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that, in 
accordance with Rule 52(a), unless a finding of bad faith is 
clearly erroneous, an appellate court will not disturb that 
finding. Ijd. at 1104. In this case, the trial court's finding 
of bad faith was not at all erroneous, but was fully supported by 
the record. 
The instant case does not involve a simple failure to 
fully investigate a claim as in Cady, but outright lies and 
material misrepresentations of fact which conclusively 
demonstrate bad faith. Plaintiff's actions show not only that he 
did not have an honest belief in the "propriety of the 
activities," but that he also tried to "defraud" the defendants. 
In Cady, the court stated that under S 78-27-56 the terms 
"lack of good faith" and "bad faith" are synonymous. 671 P.2d at 
152. 
In his deposition, plaintiff stated that his truck had 
no dents in it whatsoever and that the truck had never been in 
any accidents. (R. 502 at 76). These sworn statements were 
completely disproved by the police report, insurance claim, etc. 
that plaintiff filed for an accident that happened just weeks 
prior to the bus accident. The plaintiff was asked several times 
and in several different ways if there was any prior damage to 
his truck and each time plaintiff unequivocally stated that there 
was none. (R. 502 at 76). This was not a simple mis-
understanding as claimed by plaintiff in his brief, but 
deliberate deceit. (Appellants' Brief, p. 3) 
The fact that plaintiff had lied about damages to his 
truck caused by the bus was further demonstrated by Mr. Knight, 
the accident reconstructionist. In his unrebutted testimony, Mr. 
Knight explained that the configurations of the two vehicles, the 
lack of damage to the bus, and the photographs proved that only 
negligible damage was possible and that plaintiff's truck could 
not have been knocked forward fifteen to twenty feet as he 
claimed. (R. 509 at 167). Mr. Knight determined that the only 
possible damage caused by the bus was that a rear pipe was 
possibly kinked forward four inches. (R. 509 at 166). The same 
evidence that demonstrated the impossibility of all but 
negligible property damage to plaintiff's truck, also formed a 
basis for proving that the "impact" produced little or no 
transfer of energy forward to the driver, proving that plaintiff 
could not have received the injuries that he claimed. (R. 509 at 
166). 
As further evidence of plaintiff's deceit and 
dishonesty, plaintiff stated in his deposition that he told his 
complete medical history to every treating physician or medical 
practitioner. (R. 502 at 147-148, 151-152). The testimony of 
Dr. Reichert and the medical records of both Reichert and Burns 
show those assertions to be untrue. (R. 509 at 128-129 and 
Exhibit 18-D). 
The plaintiff also lied about not being involved in any 
subsequent accidents. Both the chiropractic records and the 
insurance claim records show that plaintiff claimed he fell off 
of his motor bike and injured himself. (See Exhibit 18-D). 
Furthermore, plaintiff's claim in his brief that the motorcycle 
crash was medically insignificant and merely arose because he 
strained his back while riding his dirt bike is itself 
discredited by the fact that Burns conducted a $55.00 
examination, took a series of x-rays, and undertook a course of 
treatment which was only terminated when plaintiff's employee 
health insurance expired. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 3, 17 and 
Exhibit 18-D). 
Following the unrebutted testimony given by defendants' 
medical and non-medical experts, which overwhelmingly showed 
there was no injury, or at best transitory injury which would not 
require medical attention, the plaintiff completely shifted his 
position. As discussed earlier, plaintiff's closing argument 
claimed only minor injuries, at best, from the bus accident, not 
major injuries as originally asserted. Although plaintiff 
changed his position in his closing argumentf he continued to 
claim that he was entitled to a verdict of $2(332.00 in special 
damages, plus general damages, for a total of over $5,000.00 for 
injuries of little or no consequence. (R. 396 and R. 510 at 
277). If plaintiff had acted in good faith, he would not have 
made such a dramatic change in position while still attempting to 
claim compensation for major medical expenses incurred on false 
pretenses. 
In short, plaintiff was necessarily well aware that he 
did not have a valid claim and he lied in order to gain 
compensation. If plaintiff ever had an honest belief in the 
"propriety of [his] activities" he would have had no reason to so 
blatantly misrepresent and mischaracterize his case. Through his 
actions, plaintiff obtained monies for property damages which did 
not result from the bus accident and further attempted to defraud 
the defendants out of thousands of dollars to either pay for 
preexisting injuries or to simply enrich himself. The trial 
court's finding of bad faith in this case is not erroneous and is 
well supported by the record. That finding was not an abuse of 
discretion, and as such, this Court should defer to the trial 
court's j udgment. 
All of the requirements under Cady were met: (1) the 
defendants were the prevailing party; (2) the claim was lacking 
in merit; and (3) the plaintiff acted in bad faith. The trial 
court's findings satisfy each of the above requirements, are 
fully supported by the record, and were not an abuse of 
discretion. Under the egregious circumstances of this case, the 
trial court's judgment was, in fact, well deserved and moderate. 
II. THB TRIAL COURT'S RULE 11 SANCTION AGAINST 
ATTORNEY HANSEN WAS PROPER AND IS FULLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD. 
In Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), this Court affirmed a Rule 11 sanction for failure to 
make a reasonable inquiry stating that Rule 11 required some 
inquiry by the attorney into both the facts and the law before 
the paper is filed, ^d. at 170. In Taylor, the plaintiff was 
contesting his brother's will and introduced a subsequent 
testamentary document which bore the signature of only one 
witness. This Court stated that a reasonable inquiry would have 
determined that such a document requires the signature of two 
witnesses. Furthermore, the "imposition of $5000.00 in attorney 
fees as a sanction for violating Rule 11 [was] not an abuse of 
[the trial court's] discretion." £d. at 172. 
This Court also noted in Taylor that had Rule 11 been 
applied in Cady, rather than S 78-27-56, "the analysis would no 
doubt have been different and the imposition of a fee sanction 
affirmed instead of reversed." Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171. This 
suggests that a finding of bad faith against Hansen is not 
necessary under Rule 11, only that Hansen did not make a 
reasonable inquiry. Therefore, the only issue is whether the 
record supports the trial court's finding that Hansen failed to 
make a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances. 
In the case at hand, the trial court's minute entry 
states that "[Hansen] could or should have sensed the nature and 
lack of merit in the case." (R. 427). The trial court later 
observed that the record as a whole "form[ed] a basis for the 
court's" decision. (R. 492). Hansen suggests, however, that he 
should not be penalized for being "overly optimistic" or "less 
intelligent than the average [attorney]" in a mistaken belief for 
his actions. (Appellant's Brief, p. 14). 
Hansen's contentions notwithstanding, he had actual 
notice and was fully aware of his client's lies and mis-
representations. During the August 9, 1988 meeting between 
defendants' counsel and Hansen, defendants' counsel disclosed to 
Hansen information concerning plaintiff's bad faith. (R. 375-
377). Hansen was shown documents from a prior rear-end collision 
that plaintiff had denied and other information specific enough 
to show that plaintiff's claims were untrue and had been brought 
in bad faith. (R. 375-377). Significantly, Hansen himself later 
stated that he was convinced that his client had lied to him and 
he was going to withdraw from the case. (R. 423, R. 511 at 13, 
16). 
Despite having seen originals of all photographs of the 
rear of plaintiff's truck, Hansen did nothing more than request a 
copy of the investigating officer's report of the earlier 
accident. (R. 378). In so doing, he chose to ignore the 
significance of the photographs of the accidents. Furthermore, 
Hansen apparently felt no need to obtain or consider the readily 
available medical records and radiographs which disproved 
plaintiff's claims of significant trauma and serious injury from 
the bus accident. This evidence, if examined, would have 
conclusively established the bad faith and lack of merit in his 
client's claims. 
All of the radiographic evidence was easily accessible 
to Hansen because it originated from plaintiff's own experts and 
treating physicians, who themselves claimed expertise in the 
reading and interpretation of radiographs (Burns Depo., pp. 131-
133 and Soderberg Depo., p. 43). Hansen had no excuse for not 
examining this evidence. Under the circumstances, a reasonable 
inquiry would have involved evaluating available evidence. 
Nevertheless, Hansen would have this Court believe that his 
characterization that "none of the evidence referred toM by Dr. 
Luers or Dr. France "was ever disclosed to Hansen or Jeschke 
before trial" somehow establishes that he and his client were 
justifiably ignorant of the true facts regarding plaintiff's lack 
of injuries. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7). 
Despite Hansen's expressly stated belief that his 
client had lied, and his actual notice of withdrawal, he 
proceeded to trial. Hansen's argument that he "[carried] forth 
his client's cause after a reasonable investigation that assured 
Although Dr. Soderberg's deposition does not unequivocally 
state that he is an expert at reading x-rays, Dr. Soderberg did 
state that if he ever had any problem in interpreting an x-ray he 
would just consult with one of his "partners." This suggests 
that Soderberg, either by himself or through his colleagues, 
possessed all the expertise necessary to read and interpret 
plaintiff's radiographs. 
him that his client's cause still had merit but in an amount much 
less than when the case was first filed" is blatantly untrue and 
totally unsupported by the record. (Appellant's Brief, p. 17). 
The totality of the evidence shows either that Hansen did not 
make a reasonable inquiry or, that if he did, he chose to ignore 
what he did find. If the representation of a reasonable inquiry 
were at all true, Hansen's opening statement and presentation of 
evidence at trial would have been markedly different. Instead, 
Hansen's opening statement and all of his evidence was directed 
towards claims of major injuries. (R. 508 at 7-10). 
Hansen would seemingly further excuse his actions by 
arguing that the trial court would not allow him to withdraw 
because he stated his reasons as "primarily economic" rather than 
"moral" in an on the record proceeding with the trial court. 
12 (Appellant's Brief, p. 5). Hansen's representation that his 
reasons were economic and not moral is simply untrue. The 
transcript of the on-the-record proceeding to which Hansen refers 
does not support his claim. (R. 511 at 13, 16). Moreover, 
Hansen telephoned defendants' counsel in late September, 1988 
representing that his client had lied to him and that he was 
therefore withdrawing from the case irrespective of whether he 
received a settlement. (R. 511 at 13, 16). 
Even assuming, arguendo, some sincerity in Hansen's 
"economic" argument, the "explanation" appealing to "economic" 
reasons does not alter the fact that overwhelming moral reasons 
Hansen filed a notice of withdrawal on September 28, 1988. 
(R. 216). 
did exist for withdrawal, reasons which Hansen chose to ignore. 
As an attorney with many years of experience, Hansen may not 
divest himself of responsibility for his own lack of appropriate 
action by attempting to shift responsibility to the trial court. 
Nor may he divest himself of responsibility by virtue of his 
alleged consultation with another attorney. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 3). 
After examining the record as a whole, the trial court 
determined that Hansen failed to meet the "reasonable inquiry" 
standard required by Rule 11, and therefore, acted properly in 
imposing on him a Rule 11 sanction. Hansen had actual notice of 
plaintiff's bad faith and expressly admitted that he knew his 
client had lied. Knowing that his client was untruthful, Hansen 
had a duty to make an inquiry appropriate to those circumstances. 
All that Hansen did, however was to rely on the dubious 
assurances of his client. Hansen's lack of a reasonable inquiry 
is fully supported by the record and this Court should affirm the 
trial court's judgment. 
III. THIS APPEAL IS BROUGHT IN VIOLATION OF RULES 33 
AND 40, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
The violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 by the 
plaintiff and Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by Attorney 
Hansen is so apparent and egregious as to make the appeal 
therefrom wholly frivolous. In bringing this appeal, the 
plaintiff and Attorney Hansen have violated Rules 33 and 40, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which state that no appeal shall be 
frivolous or brought for the purpose of delay. In the course of 
defending this appeal, defendants have incurred considerable 
costs and urge that attorney's fees be awarded pursuant to those 
Rules. 
In Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 
1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a case involving a debtor/creditor 
relationship, this Court stated that "[ajn appeal must be well 
grounded in fact or law and must not be brought for the purpose 
of delay . . . . The decision to appeal should only be reached 
after careful consideration by counsel and client." Id., at 1160. 
The case at hand is not at all "well grounded in fact 
or law." Plaintiff and Attorney Hansen are doing little more 
than re-arguing their case on appeal in hopes that this Court 
will make different findings of fact. The trial court found that 
plaintiff's claims were without merit, that plaintiff proceeded 
in bad faith, and that Hansen failed to make a reasonable 
inquiry. The record in support of these findings is so strong 
and the grounds for this appeal so flimsy that the only purpose 
of this appeal could be to delay satisfaction of judgment in 
violation of Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
See Mauqhan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)(attorney's fees are appropriate in appeals which are 
"obviously without merit, with no reasonable likelihood of 
success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment"). 
Furthermore, attorney's fees are proper for mis-
characterizing and misstating the evidence on appeal. In Eames 
v. Eames# 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this Court awarded 
attorney's fees under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
in part, because the appellant "mischaracterized and misstated" 
the evidence adduced at trial and the law. Jd. at 397. This 
Court further stated that the appellant was attempting "to take 
unconscionable advantage of his wife [during the divorce trial] 
and that the appeal was frivolous." Ici. at 398. 
In the case at hand, the plaintiff and Attorney Hansen 
have likewise mischaracterized and misstated their case on 
appeal. In the Appellant's Brief, Attorney Hansen claims that 
plaintiff's case had merit, but in an amount much less than when 
it was originally filed, and that was the course that Attorney 
Hansen supposedly pursued. (Appellant's Brief, p. 17). 
Plaintiff's opening argument, however, states: "what happened was 
that [plaintiff] sustained some very serious injuries that were 
painful [and] that curtailed his range of motion . . . and his 
present injuries are related and caused by the bus accident . . . 
(R. 508 at 7-10). The testimony given by plaintiff's experts 
likewise demonstrates that the intent of plaintiff and Hansen was 
not at all directed towards any "reassessment" of the nature or 
alleged worth of the case. The testimony showed that it was a 
claim for major damages caused solely by the bus accident. 
Yet on appeal, plaintiff and Attorney Hansen assert 
that they were only pursuing minor damages. Not until the 
plaintiff's closing argument, however, did plaintiff begin to 
13 
assert that he was only requesting minimal damages at best. In 
representing and characterizing the facts and record as they 
13 
In plaintiff's closing argument, Attorney Hansen stated that 
"I'm not here to contend that we have a major case. At best, we 
have a minor case." (R. 510 at 268). 
have, plaintiff and Attorney Hansen have seriously mis-
characterized and misstated the record on appeal. 
Hansen has further misstated and mischaracterized the 
evidence by indicating that the trial court would not let him 
withdraw because his reasons for withdrawal were primarily 
economic and not moral. (Appellants' Brief, p. 5). However, the 
transcript of the on-the-record meeting in the judge's chambers 
shows that Hansen's assertion is false. During that meeting, 
Attorney Ogilvie stated to Judge Young that Hansen told him that 
Hansen had found the "smoking gun" which proved his client had 
lied and that he was withdrawing for moral reasons. Hansen 
agreed that the above was a completely accurate account of what 
was said. (R. 511 at 13, 16). 
Both plaintiff and Hansen have taken "unconscionable 
advantage" of defendants by their conduct, mischaracterizations, 
and misstatements. This practice began prior to trial and has 
continued on appeal. Plaintiff and Hansen have not made good 
faith arguments, but are simply trying to re-argue their case, 
and in the process, have mischaracterized and misstated the 
evidence. This type of practice is in violation of Rules 33 and 
40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and defendants 
respectfully urge that sanctions and attorney's fees be imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully urge that this Court affirm the 
trial court's award of attorney's fees in the amount of $10,000 
against the plaintiff pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and 
$2,000 against Attorney Hansen under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendants further urge that this Court award 
attorney's fees for the prosecution of a frivolous appeal 
pursuant to Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this Q51L day of July, 1990. 
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